



## HAL PUTHOFF

"An Overview of the U.S.  
Government's Stance  
on UAP"



1  
00:00:39,790 --> 00:00:37,229  
since we're here to address the issue

2  
00:00:42,350 --> 00:00:39,800  
from the standpoint of government

3  
00:00:46,029 --> 00:00:42,360  
involvement I'd like to start with a

4  
00:00:49,069 --> 00:00:46,039  
kind of short rundown of where her

5  
00:00:52,229 --> 00:00:49,079  
government has been along the way with

6  
00:00:56,110 --> 00:00:52,239  
some elements that uh a lot of people

7  
00:00:59,709 --> 00:00:56,120  
may not may not be aware of of course we

8  
00:01:02,990 --> 00:00:59,719  
all know that we had the back in the 60s

9  
00:01:06,190 --> 00:01:03,000  
and and so on Project sign and Grudge

10  
00:01:10,870 --> 00:01:06,200  
and blue book and then in

11  
00:01:14,429 --> 00:01:10,880  
1969 uh the Blue Book uh was shut down

12  
00:01:17,469 --> 00:01:14,439  
based on recommendations from Condon and

13  
00:01:20,630 --> 00:01:17,479

so on so at that point if you called the

14

00:01:23,510 --> 00:01:20,640

air force uh office and said well what's

15

00:01:25,469 --> 00:01:23,520

happening in in UFOs and so on they say

16

00:01:26,910 --> 00:01:25,479

oh no no we we gave all that stuff up

17

00:01:30,590 --> 00:01:26,920

back in in

18

00:01:34,710 --> 00:01:30,600

1969 the truth of the matter is that the

19

00:01:39,630 --> 00:01:34,720

bolander memo that actually shut down

20

00:01:43,590 --> 00:01:39,640

Blue Book had underlying in fine print

21

00:01:46,510 --> 00:01:43,600

but any UFO issues that might affect

22

00:01:49,429 --> 00:01:46,520

National Security we will continue to

23

00:01:53,190 --> 00:01:49,439

follow through them and so it didn't

24

00:01:57,910 --> 00:01:53,200

really die it just went out of

25

00:02:01,830 --> 00:01:57,920

sight now along the way uh uh something

26  
00:02:05,630 --> 00:02:01,840  
that that came across my path in in this

27  
00:02:09,550 --> 00:02:05,640  
was that I was contacted by a

28  
00:02:12,470 --> 00:02:09,560  
uh CEO of a think tank in Washington

29  
00:02:15,309 --> 00:02:12,480  
DC uh this is back a couple of decades

30  
00:02:18,589 --> 00:02:15,319  
ago he says I want you to come and

31  
00:02:21,750 --> 00:02:18,599  
participate at a conference here in in

32  
00:02:24,630 --> 00:02:21,760  
Washington I said well frankly I'm too

33  
00:02:28,550 --> 00:02:24,640  
busy what's it about he says I can't

34  
00:02:31,910 --> 00:02:28,560  
tell you what it's about but if you come

35  
00:02:34,190 --> 00:02:31,920  
and you participate you will consider it

36  
00:02:36,030 --> 00:02:34,200  
later to be one of the most important

37  
00:02:39,350 --> 00:02:36,040  
conferences you ever

38  
00:02:42,509 --> 00:02:39,360

met well since I had respect for him and

39  
00:02:45,630 --> 00:02:42,519  
know his background and many things he's

40  
00:02:48,990 --> 00:02:45,640  
done I did finally decide to come to

41  
00:02:50,949 --> 00:02:49,000  
this conference and when I arrived uh

42  
00:02:54,470 --> 00:02:50,959  
there were about I don't know 15 20

43  
00:02:56,630 --> 00:02:54,480  
people I recognized some of them from

44  
00:03:02,030 --> 00:02:56,640  
the military from

45  
00:03:03,470 --> 00:03:02,040  
CIA Dia some business men and so on so I

46  
00:03:04,990 --> 00:03:03,480  
thought well this is this is quite an

47  
00:03:08,190 --> 00:03:05,000  
interesting group of

48  
00:03:09,869 --> 00:03:08,200  
people and so to start the conference

49  
00:03:13,750 --> 00:03:09,879  
off he

50  
00:03:16,030 --> 00:03:13,760  
said this conference is about disclosing

51  
00:03:20,670 --> 00:03:16,040  
something to the American

52  
00:03:24,309 --> 00:03:20,680  
public as a startup position let's

53  
00:03:28,429 --> 00:03:24,319  
assume that there have been crash revals

54  
00:03:31,869 --> 00:03:28,439  
by Russia China and the United

55  
00:03:33,350 --> 00:03:31,879  
States and the question is can we bring

56  
00:03:36,350 --> 00:03:33,360  
this out to the

57  
00:03:39,390 --> 00:03:36,360  
public and so I think I and most of the

58  
00:03:43,229 --> 00:03:39,400  
people I knew you talk to later but oh

59  
00:03:44,789 --> 00:03:43,239  
this is really cool I mean this this

60  
00:03:47,190 --> 00:03:44,799  
this could really go some

61  
00:03:49,390 --> 00:03:47,200  
place so he said okay the strategy we're

62  
00:03:51,429 --> 00:03:49,400  
going to use is we're going to make a

63  
00:03:53,789 --> 00:03:51,439

list of all the areas that you think

64

00:03:57,429 --> 00:03:53,799

would be affected by

65

00:03:59,149 --> 00:03:57,439

this and then on each one you're going

66

00:04:02,789 --> 00:03:59,159

to have to grade them on the scale from

67

00:04:04,550 --> 00:04:02,799

plus 9 to minus 9 as to the level of

68

00:04:07,190 --> 00:04:04,560

impact and whether it's positive or

69

00:04:09,710 --> 00:04:07,200

negative okay so we started out by

70

00:04:12,670 --> 00:04:09,720

making list so we start out with the

71

00:04:17,390 --> 00:04:12,680

obvious things well I mean the stock

72

00:04:19,870 --> 00:04:17,400

market uh maybe uh religions well

73

00:04:22,069 --> 00:04:19,880

certainly politics would be effective so

74

00:04:25,110 --> 00:04:22,079

we made a long list and it was really a

75

00:04:27,070 --> 00:04:25,120

long list and time we got down to the

76

00:04:32,990 --> 00:04:27,080

bottom of the list we're really in the

77

00:04:35,909 --> 00:04:33,000

weeds like okay if Corporation a has

78

00:04:39,469 --> 00:04:35,919

access to retrieve

79

00:04:41,790 --> 00:04:39,479

materials then Corporation B doesn't

80

00:04:44,990 --> 00:04:41,800

then when this comes out Corporation B

81

00:04:47,670 --> 00:04:45,000

is going to sue Corporation a sue the

82

00:04:50,790 --> 00:04:47,680

government this is really going to be a

83

00:04:52,790 --> 00:04:50,800

tough thing to kind of handle okay okay

84

00:04:54,909 --> 00:04:52,800

so anyway we broke up into groups he's

85

00:04:58,550 --> 00:04:54,919

taking a certain number of the things

86

00:05:01,909 --> 00:04:58,560

that were in our list

87

00:05:07,070 --> 00:05:04,070

and in my

88

00:05:08,070 --> 00:05:07,080

group we added up the numbers plus 9 to

89

00:05:11,510 --> 00:05:08,080

minus

90

00:05:13,710 --> 00:05:11,520

9 and we ended up in the negative

91

00:05:16,430 --> 00:05:13,720

category even though we were kind of

92

00:05:17,830 --> 00:05:16,440

positively disposed to the idea so I

93

00:05:20,950 --> 00:05:17,840

thought well maybe that just has to do

94

00:05:24,070 --> 00:05:20,960

with particular list that we got so then

95

00:05:28,070 --> 00:05:24,080

I talked to other people that R other

96

00:05:31,469 --> 00:05:28,080

list and said you know we came to a

97

00:05:34,150 --> 00:05:31,479

negative number also well make a long

98

00:05:36,670 --> 00:05:34,160

story short it turned out that everybody

99

00:05:39,909 --> 00:05:36,680

going through these lists it was a very

100

00:05:42,350 --> 00:05:39,919

sophisticated situation with complex

101  
00:05:45,189 --> 00:05:42,360  
computers and big screens and all that

102  
00:05:48,230 --> 00:05:45,199  
kind of stuff it finally came down to

103  
00:05:51,350 --> 00:05:48,240  
the fact that the problem

104  
00:05:53,990 --> 00:05:51,360  
was there's so many areas to

105  
00:05:56,710 --> 00:05:54,000  
handle and there was no way to handle

106  
00:06:01,710 --> 00:05:56,720  
them all at the same

107  
00:06:04,029 --> 00:06:01,720  
time and so the final result was

108  
00:06:06,270 --> 00:06:04,039  
therefore believe said we're going to

109  
00:06:09,189 --> 00:06:06,280  
recommend that we don't go forward with

110  
00:06:11,110 --> 00:06:09,199  
this and so those of us who were

111  
00:06:13,430 --> 00:06:11,120  
participating in this were pretty

112  
00:06:14,790 --> 00:06:13,440  
disappointed thinking you know we

113  
00:06:16,230 --> 00:06:14,800

started thinking that you know this

114

00:06:17,990 --> 00:06:16,240

would be a good thing to

115

00:06:23,510 --> 00:06:18,000

do so

116

00:06:26,469 --> 00:06:23,520

anyway let's go forward up to let's say

117

00:06:30,309 --> 00:06:26,479

uh

118

00:06:33,550 --> 00:06:30,319

2008 now you suddenly have as

119

00:06:36,550 --> 00:06:33,560

Lesley proclaimed so well in her

120

00:06:40,390 --> 00:06:36,560

December 2017 article in the New York

121

00:06:44,189 --> 00:06:40,400

Times U Senators

122

00:06:53,550 --> 00:06:49,830

uh uh let's see Senators Reed Inu and

123

00:06:56,990 --> 00:06:53,560

Stevens decided that there should be a

124

00:06:58,029 --> 00:06:57,000

new study started from scratch with new

125

00:07:01,830 --> 00:06:58,039

people

126

00:07:04,869 --> 00:07:01,840

involved to to investigate the

127

00:07:06,909 --> 00:07:04,879

area so I would like to remind you that

128

00:07:09,629 --> 00:07:06,919

those three senators were all part of

129

00:07:12,230 --> 00:07:09,639

the gang of eight which means they

130

00:07:13,790 --> 00:07:12,240

probably had some background as to you

131

00:07:18,629 --> 00:07:13,800

know why this was a good

132

00:07:22,390 --> 00:07:18,639

idea and so they uh told the defense

133

00:07:24,309 --> 00:07:22,400

intelligence agency to start a program

134

00:07:27,749 --> 00:07:24,319

now this was the oap

135

00:07:30,950 --> 00:07:27,759

program uh which you you're probably all

136

00:07:33,150 --> 00:07:30,960

familiar with uh Advanced Aerospace

137

00:07:36,110 --> 00:07:33,160

Weapons Systems application program

138

00:07:39,070 --> 00:07:36,120

which eventually morphed into HP

139

00:07:41,710 --> 00:07:39,080

Advanced Aerospace thread identification

140

00:07:42,749 --> 00:07:41,720

program and the requirements of the DIA

141

00:07:46,110 --> 00:07:42,759

were

142

00:07:49,270 --> 00:07:46,120

two one the most obvious one of course

143

00:07:50,589 --> 00:07:49,280

is where are these things coming from

144

00:07:53,550 --> 00:07:50,599

what's their

145

00:07:56,589 --> 00:07:53,560

intent uh what do we have to deal with

146

00:07:59,589 --> 00:07:56,599

here it turns out that that was not a

147

00:08:03,309 --> 00:07:59,599

particular interest it was really item

148

00:08:06,710 --> 00:08:03,319

number two and that is since we know

149

00:08:11,029 --> 00:08:06,720

other countries are researching this

150

00:08:13,550 --> 00:08:11,039

getting access to materials and so on

151

00:08:16,950 --> 00:08:13,560

what happens if they

152

00:08:20,270 --> 00:08:16,960

develop Advanced Technologies in our

153

00:08:22,710 --> 00:08:20,280

adversarial uh competitors that leaped

154

00:08:26,309 --> 00:08:22,720

ahead of us that's what they were most

155

00:08:28,749 --> 00:08:26,319

worried about so we had to take on that

156

00:08:31,949 --> 00:08:28,759

as as our challenge to figure out you

157

00:08:36,230 --> 00:08:31,959

know you what could it be

158

00:08:38,110 --> 00:08:36,240

now the list of things they wanted us to

159

00:08:39,990 --> 00:08:38,120

uh

160

00:08:42,750 --> 00:08:40,000

investigate and I want you to think

161

00:08:45,710 --> 00:08:42,760

about the fact that they must have known

162

00:08:48,150 --> 00:08:45,720

something to make a list like

163

00:08:50,310 --> 00:08:48,160

this they were interested in 12

164

00:08:56,110 --> 00:08:50,320

Potential Threat areas with regard to

165

00:08:59,790 --> 00:08:56,120

UAP lift propulsion control Power

166

00:09:03,110 --> 00:08:59,800

Generation SpaceTime translation

167

00:09:04,350 --> 00:09:03,120

materials configuration structure

168

00:09:08,870 --> 00:09:04,360

signature

169

00:09:12,790 --> 00:09:08,880

reduction human effects human interface

170

00:09:15,710 --> 00:09:12,800

Armament and peripheral support issues

171

00:09:17,750 --> 00:09:15,720

well that's a pretty intelligent list so

172

00:09:21,230 --> 00:09:17,760

chances are you've got some knowledge

173

00:09:23,990 --> 00:09:21,240

that's driving this list so our ingoing

174

00:09:27,110 --> 00:09:24,000

assumption was okay and maybe what we

175

00:09:31,470 --> 00:09:27,120

have heard way back in 2004 was true and

176  
00:09:35,030 --> 00:09:31,480  
that is country do have access to crash

177  
00:09:37,710 --> 00:09:35,040  
PR materials okay so well let's just go

178  
00:09:40,190 --> 00:09:37,720  
get their materials and get them men the

179  
00:09:42,750 --> 00:09:40,200  
scientific

180  
00:09:46,269 --> 00:09:42,760  
Community part of my job was to try to

181  
00:09:47,630 --> 00:09:46,279  
negotiate that and the answer was this

182  
00:09:50,230 --> 00:09:47,640  
is so

183  
00:09:53,350 --> 00:09:50,240  
compartmentalized it just isn't going to

184  
00:09:56,670 --> 00:09:53,360  
happen when I say compartmentalized I

185  
00:09:58,550 --> 00:09:56,680  
mean people had stuff in their basements

186  
00:10:00,750 --> 00:09:58,560  
that they would love to have brought up

187  
00:10:03,990 --> 00:10:00,760  
to their scientists and Engineers of the

188  
00:10:08,350 --> 00:10:04,000

top four it was so compartmentalized and

189

00:10:11,190 --> 00:10:08,360

so secure they couldn't do that so that

190

00:10:13,590 --> 00:10:11,200

turned out to be a nonstarter said okay

191

00:10:18,190 --> 00:10:13,600

well let's try Plan

192

00:10:20,829 --> 00:10:18,200

B pass all the materials to us we'll set

193

00:10:23,430 --> 00:10:20,839

up a kind of a buffer organization and

194

00:10:26,470 --> 00:10:23,440

then we'll come in the front door for

195

00:10:29,790 --> 00:10:26,480

your people to work on it and we won't

196

00:10:31,550 --> 00:10:29,800

reveal where this stuff uh came from so

197

00:10:33,030 --> 00:10:31,560

that that'll give you you know what what

198

00:10:37,350 --> 00:10:33,040

you need to separate

199

00:10:38,670 --> 00:10:37,360

it that got shot down big time so we

200

00:10:41,790 --> 00:10:38,680

went to plan

201  
00:10:44,509 --> 00:10:41,800  
C plan C was

202  
00:10:46,590 --> 00:10:44,519  
okay we can't do this the obvious

203  
00:10:50,710 --> 00:10:46,600  
straightforward way all this technical

204  
00:10:54,230 --> 00:10:50,720  
stuff so how about

205  
00:10:56,110 --> 00:10:54,240  
this let's go to all the experts in the

206  
00:10:57,829 --> 00:10:56,120  
world that we wish we could have passed

207  
00:11:01,069 --> 00:10:57,839  
this information

208  
00:11:04,110 --> 00:11:01,079  
unto and and tell them that we're just

209  
00:11:06,590 --> 00:11:04,120  
doing a survey for bigo

210  
00:11:09,790 --> 00:11:06,600  
Aerospace we'd like to know where your

211  
00:11:11,670 --> 00:11:09,800  
field will be in the year

212  
00:11:14,430 --> 00:11:11,680  
2050

213  
00:11:19,190 --> 00:11:14,440

unclassified could go to people in other

214

00:11:24,190 --> 00:11:21,990

uh the kinds of programs that they that

215

00:11:26,629 --> 00:11:24,200

they set up for us I'll just read a few

216

00:11:30,230 --> 00:11:26,639

of them there were 38 all together

217

00:11:34,030 --> 00:11:30,240

actually just to give you an idea of how

218

00:11:36,990 --> 00:11:34,040

technical we consider this program to be

219

00:11:39,069 --> 00:11:37,000

a neutronic fusion propulsion

220

00:11:42,910 --> 00:11:39,079

superconductors and Gravity

221

00:11:46,389 --> 00:11:42,920

Research positron Aerospace propulsor

222

00:11:48,430 --> 00:11:46,399

warp drive Dark Energy extra Dimensions

223

00:11:49,629 --> 00:11:48,440

Advanced nuclear propulsion brain

224

00:11:52,750 --> 00:11:49,639

machine

225

00:11:53,829 --> 00:11:52,760

interfaces IEC Fusion as a compact

226

00:11:59,670 --> 00:11:53,839

energy

227

00:12:03,310 --> 00:11:59,680

SpaceTime metric engineering traversable

228

00:12:06,350 --> 00:12:03,320

wormholes Stargates Advanced Aerospace

229

00:12:11,269 --> 00:12:06,360

materials metallic glasses for Aerospace

230

00:12:15,310 --> 00:12:11,279

use mbased bio sensors and on and on and

231

00:12:19,470 --> 00:12:15,320

on so we had uh got 38 of

232

00:12:22,110 --> 00:12:19,480

those uh none of the individuals that we

233

00:12:24,150 --> 00:12:22,120

approach had any idea had anything to do

234

00:12:25,750 --> 00:12:24,160

with trying to figure out anything about

235

00:12:27,910 --> 00:12:25,760

ET

236

00:12:29,470 --> 00:12:27,920

Technologies and so we told you you

237

00:12:32,430 --> 00:12:29,480

could even publish in the open

238

00:12:36,629 --> 00:12:32,440

literature and and many of them did when

239

00:12:39,590 --> 00:12:36,639

I gathered them all up we posted them on

240

00:12:40,430 --> 00:12:39,600

What's called the jaywick website for uh

241

00:12:43,990 --> 00:12:40,440

the

242

00:12:47,430 --> 00:12:44,000

Pentagon uh as dirs

243

00:12:49,470 --> 00:12:47,440

dir's defense intelligence reference

244

00:12:51,949 --> 00:12:49,480

documents and usually when you publish

245

00:12:54,069 --> 00:12:51,959

technical papers like that this is just

246

00:12:56,310 --> 00:12:54,079

for contractors in the intelligence

247

00:12:58,590 --> 00:12:56,320

Community uh they go up there and

248

00:13:01,870 --> 00:12:58,600

they're of interest to people for about

249

00:13:06,790 --> 00:13:01,880

uh a month or so we were told that this

250

00:13:09,949 --> 00:13:06,800

series of dirs was the most high quality

251

00:13:12,230 --> 00:13:09,959

longlasting set they ever put up they

252

00:13:14,990 --> 00:13:12,240

just couldn't take them down because

253

00:13:17,150 --> 00:13:15,000

everybody was you know really into uh

254

00:13:19,629 --> 00:13:17,160

you know wanting to see these So

255

00:13:20,750 --> 00:13:19,639

eventually as time goes forward and

256

00:13:24,110 --> 00:13:20,760

people do

257

00:13:26,470 --> 00:13:24,120

FAS at this point all of the these

258

00:13:29,509 --> 00:13:26,480

papers have basically been made

259

00:13:30,949 --> 00:13:29,519

available and you and you can get them

260

00:13:33,509 --> 00:13:30,959

and of course I thought all these people

261

00:13:35,110 --> 00:13:33,519

were going to trouun all over me and say

262

00:13:38,750 --> 00:13:35,120

oh my God you didn't tell me to say

263

00:13:41,710 --> 00:13:38,760

anything to do with ET or UFOs or

264

00:13:43,990 --> 00:13:41,720

whatever but the quality papers we got

265

00:13:46,790 --> 00:13:44,000

uh I think are probably almost as good

266

00:13:49,910 --> 00:13:46,800

as if we had been able to share

267

00:13:53,150 --> 00:13:49,920

materials and so on so anyway that's

268

00:13:56,790 --> 00:13:53,160

that's where we uh have come up to at

269

00:13:59,710 --> 00:13:56,800

the present time and of course now uh

270

00:14:04,790 --> 00:13:59,720

after her article appeared and all the

271

00:14:09,629 --> 00:14:04,800

interest came up and as you know we have

272

00:14:12,470 --> 00:14:09,639

uh people like Dave brush coming forward

273

00:14:15,509 --> 00:14:12,480

and saying straight out we've got

274

00:14:17,269 --> 00:14:15,519

materials craft

275

00:14:21,150 --> 00:14:17,279

and

276

00:14:24,189 --> 00:14:21,160

bodies he's not the only one as it turns

277

00:14:29,629 --> 00:14:24,199

out the person who ran the program at

278

00:14:37,710 --> 00:14:29,639

DIA for us was uh Jim laty

279

00:14:43,110 --> 00:14:40,910

name and they just published a

280

00:14:46,189 --> 00:14:43,120

book

281

00:14:49,749 --> 00:14:46,199

lasi who ran the program from

282

00:14:51,990 --> 00:14:49,759

DIA col kellerer who was the project

283

00:14:53,790 --> 00:14:52,000

manager at bigo Advanced Aerospace

284

00:14:57,430 --> 00:14:53,800

studies who was the prim

285

00:15:00,749 --> 00:14:57,440

contractor and George na called inside

286

00:15:03,150 --> 00:15:00,759

the US government overt UFO programs

287

00:15:06,030 --> 00:15:03,160

initial

288

00:15:07,790 --> 00:15:06,040

Revelations and uh one of the key

289

00:15:11,670 --> 00:15:07,800

phrases in there that certainly caught

290

00:15:14,910 --> 00:15:11,680

my attention when I saw it was that Jim

291

00:15:17,310 --> 00:15:14,920

laty who is also a very

292

00:15:21,790 --> 00:15:17,320

high intelligence

293

00:15:25,470 --> 00:15:21,800

Community uh responsible

294

00:15:29,389 --> 00:15:25,480

individual reveals in the book that we

295

00:15:33,110 --> 00:15:29,399

have craft of Unknown Origin and we've

296

00:15:35,710 --> 00:15:33,120

gotten inside it so it isn't just Dave

297

00:15:38,389 --> 00:15:35,720

Rush as a high level intelligence person

298

00:15:41,829 --> 00:15:38,399

bringing us out to the world we now have

299

00:15:44,430 --> 00:15:41,839

the person who ran this program which is

300

00:15:47,990 --> 00:15:44,440

a very significant program so anyway

301  
00:15:49,949 --> 00:15:48,000  
that's that's where we come to so uh I

302  
00:15:51,990 --> 00:15:49,959  
think Now's the Time that you know we

303  
00:15:56,189 --> 00:15:52,000  
have all these reasons to take this

304  
00:15:58,990 --> 00:15:56,199  
really seriously and to to uh expect

305  
00:16:00,670 --> 00:15:59,000  
that something is going to come out into

306  
00:16:04,230 --> 00:16:00,680  
the public and of course many of you

307  
00:16:06,670 --> 00:16:04,240  
know about the Schumer Amendment uh

308  
00:16:08,389 --> 00:16:06,680  
where can't believe it in a

309  
00:16:11,430 --> 00:16:08,399  
congressional

310  
00:16:13,870 --> 00:16:11,440  
Amendment the word nhi non-human

311  
00:16:18,710 --> 00:16:13,880  
intelligence appears over 20

312  
00:16:22,030 --> 00:16:18,720  
times and uh if that

313  
00:16:24,350 --> 00:16:22,040

passes things will move forward at some

314

00:16:25,990 --> 00:16:24,360

relatively rapid clip but there are

315

00:16:29,430 --> 00:16:26,000

going to be problems because some of the

316

00:16:32,790 --> 00:16:29,440

problems are going to go back to what we

317

00:16:35,189 --> 00:16:32,800

looked at Even in our disclosure

318

00:16:38,790 --> 00:16:35,199

conference and that

319

00:16:41,230 --> 00:16:38,800

is people get

320

00:16:44,189 --> 00:16:41,240

materials ordinarily you say okay it's

321

00:16:46,189 --> 00:16:44,199

on a contract the government has you

322

00:16:49,670 --> 00:16:46,199

know access to it and so

323

00:16:52,189 --> 00:16:49,680

on but originally when they went to

324

00:16:53,629 --> 00:16:52,199

Aerospace corporations and elsewhere and

325

00:16:56,309 --> 00:16:53,639

said you know you got to help us with

326

00:16:57,470 --> 00:16:56,319

this problem their answer was we're not

327

00:16:59,350 --> 00:16:57,480

going to do

328

00:17:00,629 --> 00:16:59,360

that well what do you mean you're not

329

00:17:03,430 --> 00:17:00,639

going to do that I mean we're going to

330

00:17:05,669 --> 00:17:03,440

give you money yeah but then you'll own

331

00:17:08,870 --> 00:17:05,679

it all and you know we'll work on it

332

00:17:14,309 --> 00:17:08,880

you'll take advantage of it so they

333

00:17:17,669 --> 00:17:14,319

basically said uh okay if we have

334

00:17:19,470 --> 00:17:17,679

control then we'll consider doing it and

335

00:17:22,949 --> 00:17:19,480

there are technical ways of getting

336

00:17:26,429 --> 00:17:22,959

control for example if you're on a

337

00:17:28,830 --> 00:17:26,439

contract and uh you sign an NDA or

338

00:17:32,070 --> 00:17:28,840

whatever well I mean the government is

339

00:17:37,430 --> 00:17:32,080

involved on the other hand there are

340

00:17:39,710 --> 00:17:37,440

things called irad internal R&B that all

341

00:17:42,110 --> 00:17:39,720

major corporations have where they get

342

00:17:44,390 --> 00:17:42,120

money from the government but it's for

343

00:17:46,590 --> 00:17:44,400

them to do whatever they want to do and

344

00:17:50,470 --> 00:17:46,600

whatever they do they

345

00:17:55,789 --> 00:17:50,480

own and so that's an issue that's going

346

00:17:59,430 --> 00:17:55,799

to put a damper on complete disclosure

347

00:18:02,390 --> 00:17:59,440

to the public I'm sure so

348

00:18:03,830 --> 00:18:02,400

these aspects of the Schumer memorandum

349

00:18:07,630 --> 00:18:03,840

they really going to have to work on

350

00:18:09,750 --> 00:18:07,640

that to to to make it work to where uh

351

00:18:12,870 --> 00:18:09,760

you know the public in general has going

352

00:18:15,110 --> 00:18:12,880

to learn a lot but I think I think we're

353

00:18:16,950 --> 00:18:15,120

on the right track so that's that's

354

00:18:27,310 --> 00:18:16,960

that's where we are on the development